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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
In this consolidated appeal, Francis Brooks, Enid 
Edwards, and Bill John-Baptiste challenge their convictions 
following trial before the District Court.  All convictions 
stemmed from the defendants’ alleged extortion, kidnapping, 
bribes, and drug trafficking while each served as law 
enforcement officers.  Brooks and Edwards were employed 
with the Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”), and 
John-Baptiste was employed by the Virgin Islands Port 
Authority (“VIPA”).  Defendants challenge their convictions 
on various constitutional and evidentiary grounds.  In 
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addition, the government cross-appeals the District Court’s 
judgment of acquittal on certain counts.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment of 
acquittal as to counts 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 46, and affirm the 
judgment of the District Court with respect to all other counts.     
 
I.  Background 
 
This case presents a sordid picture of “law 
enforcement officers” who sought to enrich themselves rather 
than protect the public by engaging in a protracted pattern of 
criminality that included extortion, drug dealing and 
kidnapping, all at the expense of the residents of the United 
States Virgin Islands.   
 
In September 2010, a federal grand jury issued a 53-
count superseding indictment against the defendants, and the 
case proceeded to trial.  At trial, the prosecution introduced 
the following evidence as to particular charges in the 
superseding indictment. 
 
 A. Evidence of Specific Crimes 
 1.   Brooks and Edwards Distribute Six 
Pounds of Marijuana for Resale. (Counts 2 to 4) 
 
Kelvin Moses testified that in 2005, Brooks and 
Edwards approached him in their police cruiser and sold him 
six pounds of marijuana for him to resell.  Joint App. 643-46.  
Moses also testified that prior to this exchange, from 2000 to 
2003 and from 2005 to 2007, he routinely paid money to 
Brooks and Edwards for information regarding other people 
who were cooperating with them.    
 
 2. Brooks and Edwards Impound a 
Truck and Extort Payment From The Owner.  
(Counts 5 to 12) 
 
Kenneth Love testified that in 2007, Brooks and 
Edwards illegally impounded his truck.  Edwards told Love 
that he would have to pay $1,200 to get his truck back, and 
further informed him that she had been “taking money . . . 
from people” for 19 years.  Joint App. 572-73.  Love also 
testified that Brooks and Edwards eventually arranged for 
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him to pay approximately $825 in cash to release the truck.  
Joint App. 603-04.    
 
3. Brooks, Edwards and John-Baptiste Arrest a 
Taxi Driver and Hold Her in Custody Until her Boyfriend 
Pays for her Release. (Counts 24 to 33) 
 
In April 2008, John-Baptiste arrested taxi driver, 
Yvese Calixte, for a parking violation.  John-Baptiste 
proceeded to forcibly detain Calixte until VIPD officers 
arrived, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police car.  John-
Baptiste followed behind as the officers drove Calixte to a 
VIPD facility, and placed her in a holding cell where she 
remained for four to five hours.  Joint App. 737-39.  Calixte 
was eventually transferred to a downtown jail, where she was 
processed for booking.  Id. at 743.  Thereafter, John-Baptiste 
handcuffed Calixte and drove her to a shipping station, where 
they were met by Brooks, Edwards, and Calixte’s boyfriend, 
Jossenel Morino.  Calixte was finally released, but only after 
Morino paid $1,000 to Brooks and Edwards in exchange for 
her freedom. 
 
4. Brooks Extorts Payment from Felon in Possession 
of a Firearm in Exchange for Not Arresting Him; 
Edwards and Brooks then Coerce Him into Selling 
Cocaine for Them (Counts 34 to 38 &    
 39 to 46) 
 
John Lindquist, a convicted felon, testified that in 
2009, Brooks approached him while Lindquist had a gun in 
his possession.  In exchange for not arresting him, Brooks 
asked Lindquist for $2,000, which Lindquist paid over the 
course of the next month.  Months later, Lindquist 
encountered Brooks again while carrying another gun. 
Lindquist testified that Brooks and Edwards gave him 4.5 
ounces of crack cocaine to sell for them in exchange for not 
being arrested.  After Lindquist sold the drugs, he paid 
Brooks $3,500 over the course of the following months.1   
                                              
1 Additionally, the following evidence was admitted for 
counts that were ultimately dismissed pre-verdict pursuant to 
defendants’ Rule 29 motion for acquittal, see Joint Appx. 
1311, 2102-2: (1) Elias Deeb, an undocumented Syrian 
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B.  Post Trial Motions. 
 
At the close of trial, the jury convicted Brooks and 
Edwards of: conspiracy under the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO); 
conspiracy and extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1951(a) & (2); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 
distribution of and possession with intent to distribute 
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 
conspiracy, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 551; extortion, in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 701 & 11; solicitation and receipt of 
a bribe, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 403 & 11; and conflict of 
interest, in violation of 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102(3) & 1108 and 14 
V.I.C. § 11.  The jury convicted John-Baptiste of kidnapping 
and false imprisonment, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 1051 & 
11. 
 
Following their convictions, defendants moved for 
judgments of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, and for new trials 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  The District Court granted defendants’ Rule 29 
motions as to counts 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 35, and 46.  
Thereafter, the District Court sentenced both Brooks and 
Edwards to 151 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 
                                                                                                     
immigrant who came to the United States in 2004 and was 
seeking asylum, testified that in 2004 Edwards offered to 
illegally obtain a driver’s license for him.  Joint App. 373.  
Deeb eventually became an informant for the FBI and DEA.  
Over the course of several meetings, he gave Brooks and 
Edwards $900 in cash and a CD player in exchange for the 
license.  Joint App. at 394, 409-11, 418 (Counts 13 to 23); (2) 
A man going by the name of Troy Willock claims that in 
early 2008, Brooks and Edwards approached him and his 
friends while they sat outside a local bakery.  (As we discuss 
below, there is a controversy over the identity of the man who 
actually testified at trial).  The officers frisked the men and 
Brooks removed a Ziploc bag filled with marijuana from 
inside a man’s pocket.  However, no one was arrested 
(Counts 47 to 52). 
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years’ supervised release. John-Baptiste was sentenced to 60 
months imprisonment.  These appeals followed. 
 
II.  Discussion 
 
We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final 
order and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3731 & 3742. 
  
A.  Sufficiency of the Indictment 
 
Prior to trial, Brooks moved to dismiss the indictment 
because the government failed to identify the victims of each 
crime by name.  According to Brooks, the indictment was 
invalid because it failed to provide him with sufficient 
information to prepare a defense, and to plead double 
jeopardy in case of future prosecution.  Brooks renews this 
claim before us. This presents a legal question over which we 
have plenary review.  United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 
280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
 The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for 
measuring the sufficiency of an indictment.  Russell v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962).  Under this test, an 
indictment is sufficient when it (1) “contains the elements of 
the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises 
the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet,” id. at 
763, and (2) allows him to “plead an acquittal or conviction in 
bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”  Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).  We have recognized 
that “[a]n indictment must allege more than just the essential 
elements of the offense.”  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 
314, 321 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, “‘[n]o greater specificity 
than the statutory language is required so long as there is 
sufficient factual orientation’ to permit a defendant to prepare 
his defense and invoke double jeopardy.”  United States v. 
Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280).   
 
Brooks’s argument is wholly grounded upon the 
second of the above-cited factors. He claims that he cannot 
assert a double jeopardy claim in the future because the 
indictment omits the names of the alleged victims.  He 
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correctly notes that the indictment only references dates and 
the nature of the statutory offense charged in each count and 
does not include the name of any of the alleged victims.  For 
example, Brooks highlights count 25, charging racketeering 
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2.  That 
portion of the indictment states: 
On or about April 2, 2008, at St. Thomas in the 
District of  
the Virgin Islands, ENID EDWARDS, 
FRANCIS BROOKS  
and BILL JOHN-BAPTISTE, while acting 
under color of  
official right as law enforcement officers of the 
Virgin   
Islands, did knowingly and intentionally affect 
commerce  
by extortion, and attempted to do so, and aided 
and abetted  
the same; namely, by unlawfully requiring an 
individual  
to pay money in order for the individual to 
recover a  
vehicle that had been towed pursuant to police 
directive  
authority. 
 
Brooks App. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 
 The specificity required for an indictment to have 
“‘sufficient factual orientation’ to permit a defendant to 
prepare his defense and invoke double jeopardy,” is not 
particularly onerous.  Huet, 665 F.3d at 595 (quoting United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280).  We have found that a 
defendant has sufficient notice to guard against a future 
prosecution in violation of the protection against double 
jeopardy if an indictment specifies the time frame for the 
criminal conduct.  See United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d at 596 
(reversing District Court’s order dismissing an indictment 
where the relevant charge listed all required elements of the 
offense and where it also “specifie[d] the time period during 
which the violation occurred” by including the temporal 
description “on or about August 10, 2007, to on or about 
January 11, 2008.”).   
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Although this indictment could easily have identified 
the alleged victims, it adequately specified the period in 
which the alleged crimes occurred, and set forth enough 
specificity about the crimes charged to protect against any 
subsequent attempt to charge Brooks with any crimes arising 
from the conduct that is the subject of this indictment.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment was sufficiently 
specific to withstand a double jeopardy challenge.2  
 B.  John-Baptiste’s Motion for Severance.3 
 
The jury returned a verdict finding John-Baptiste 
guilty of a single count (count 27), charging false 
imprisonment and kidnapping, and acquitted him of all other 
charges.4 
                                              
2 For example, the trial evidence identified the specific 
incident that occurred on April 2, 2008, as charged in count 
25, as the extortion of $500 for the release of Calixte and her 
taxi. 
 
   In rejecting the challenge to the specificity of this 
indictment, we by no means condone the lack of precision 
that is evident on the face of this indictment.  Nothing here 
suggests a need to withhold the identity of various victims 
because of any concerns for their safety, and the government 
has not attempted to defend the manner in which this 
indictment was drafted by asserting any such concerns.  
Although the specificity in the indictment is adequate, we 
would hope that greater care is taken in drafting indictments 
in the future.  
 
3 We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 
2005).   
 
4 Specifically, the jury acquitted John-Baptiste of interfering 
with interstate commerce (count 25), kidnapping for extortion 
(count 28), extortion (29), solicitation and receipt of a bribe 
(count 30), conflict of interest (count 32), aggravated assault 
and battery (count 32), and unlawful sexual contact (count 
33). 
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John-Baptiste argues that the District Court erred in 
rejecting his pre-trial requests for severance under either F. R. 
Crim. P. 8(b) or 14(a).  He argues that the government’s case 
against him stemmed solely from the April 2, 2008 incident 
involving Calixte, and joinder in an indictment containing 
numerous other charges against other defendants allowed 
evidence admissible only against Brooks and Edwards to 
improperly “spillover” and be used against him.  
 
A defendant seeking a new trial due to the denial of a 
severance motion must show that the joint trial led to “clear 
and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair 
trial.”  United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Mere allegations 
of prejudice are not enough,” United States v. Reicherter, 647 
F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981), and defendants are “not entitled 
to severance merely because they may have a better chance of 
acquittal in separate trials.”  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 
534, 540 (1993).  Thus, as we have previously explained, the 
critical issue when considering the potential for prejudice “is 
not whether the evidence against a co-defendant is more 
damaging but rather whether the jury will be able to 
‘compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate 
defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility.’”  
Davis, 397 F.3d at 182 (quoting United States v. Somers, 496 
F.2d 723, 730 (3d Cir. 1974)). 
 
Here, John-Baptiste cannot establish that the evidence 
presented against Edwards and Brooks resulted in clear and 
substantial prejudice to his case.  As noted, his sole 
contention is that the evidence against Edwards and Brooks 
was so extensive that it prevented the jury from reliably 
determining his guilt.  See John-Baptiste Br. at 24.  However, 
severance is not required simply because the evidence against 
his co-defendants may be stronger than the evidence against 
John-Baptiste.  See Urban, 404 F.3d at 776 (“[A] defendant is 
not entitled to severance merely because the evidence against 
a co-defendant is more damaging than that against him.”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States 
v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Prejudice 
should not be found in a joint trial just because all evidence 
adduced is not germane to all counts against each defendant 
or some evidence adduced is more damaging to one defendant 
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than others.”); see also United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 
62 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 
Additionally, nothing suggests that the jury was unable 
to “compartmentalize the evidence as it relate[d] to separate 
defendants . . . . ”  Davis, 397 F.3d at 182, nor does John-
Baptiste point to any evidence of that happening. We realize 
that only eight of the 54 counts in this indictment involved 
John-Baptiste and his involvement in the scheme to kidnap 
Calixte and hold her for ransom.  However, the evidence that 
was relevant to those charges was easily separated and 
compartmentalized from testimony that was admitted 
regarding Edwards’s or Brooks’s involvement in the other 
charged offenses.  See, e.g., Davis, 397 F.3d at 182 (rejecting 
claim of prejudice where “facts [] relatively simple; all events 
occurred in a single evening; there are only three defendants; 
and there are no overly technical or scientific issues”).  
Finally, in instructing the jury, the District Court underscored 
that “[e]ach count and the evidence pertaining to it should be 
considered separately” and that “[t]he case of each defendant 
should be considered separately and individually.”  Joint App. 
2142-43.  Accordingly, we conclude that the jury could have 
compartmentalized the evidence on each count and each 
defendant as instructed.   
 
C. The Virgin Islands False Imprisonment and 
Kidnapping Statute  
 
John-Baptiste also challenges the District Court’s 
interpretation and application of  14 V.I.C. § 1051 (the Virgin 
Islands false imprisonment and kidnapping statute).  He first 
claims that he District Court erroneously ignored the 
requirement that a defendant act “without lawful authority” in 
committing the offense.  Second, John-Baptiste argues that 
the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as 
interpreted because it provides no notice to law enforcement 
officers that they can be charged and convicted of 
kidnapping.  The arguments border on frivolity. 
 
14 V.I.C. § 1051 provides in pertinent part: 
 
Whoever without lawful authority confines or 
imprisons  
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another person within this Territory against his 
will,  
or confines . . . or kidnaps another person, with  
intent to cause him to be confined or imprisoned 
in this  
Territory against his will . . .  is guilty of  
kidnapping and shall be imprisoned for not less 
than one  
and not more than 20 years. 
 
14 V.I.C. § 1051.  As noted, the jury convicted John-Baptiste 
of one count of kidnapping for which he received a sentence 
of five years’ imprisonment. 
 
 In arguing that the District Court erroneously 
interpreted “without lawful authority,” John-Baptiste claims 
that, given his authority as a peace officer to make arrests 
with or without a warrant, any arrest he makes must 
necessarily be “within lawful authority.”  The argument is at 
best, misguided and at most, fanciful.  This Virgin Islands 
statute provides peace officers with lawful authority to make 
arrests in routine circumstances—e.g., when they have 
witnessed a public offense or when there is reasonable cause 
to believe that a person has committed a felony.  See 5 V.I.C. 
§ 3562.5  No reasonable interpretation of the statute would 
                                              
5 In its entirety, the statute provides: 
 
A peace officer may make an arrest in 
obedience to a warrant delivered to him, 
or may, without a warrant, arrest a 
person— 
 (1) for a public offense committed 
or attempted in his presence;  
 (2) when a person has committed 
a felony, although not in his presence;  
(3) when a felony has in fact been 
committed and he has reasonable 
cause for believing the person to 
have 
 committed it;  
(4) on a charge made, upon a 
reasonable cause, of the 
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convert it to a license to empower peace officers to act 
outside of this authority or detain someone for a criminal 
purpose.  Indeed, the slightest modicum of common sense 
would negate the conclusion that the statute allows police 
officers to engage in criminality merely because they have 
been authorized to uphold the law.  Yet, that is precisely the 
interpretation that John-Baptiste urges upon us.   
 
 Notwithstanding John-Baptiste’s argument to the 
contrary, it is well-settled that law enforcement officers are 
subject to prosecution under criminal statutes when they act 
unlawfully or “without legal authority.”  See, e.g., Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a 
defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy 
lies . . . in prosecuting the police under the applicable 
provisions of state or federal law.”); see also Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“This Court has never 
suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil 
immunity for certain government officials also place them 
beyond the reach of criminal law.”). 
 
 A recent case decided by the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals is illustrative.  In United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), a divided panel of the First Circuit 
upheld the conviction of several police officer defendants for 
drug distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841.  The officers 
unlawfully transferred marijuana and cocaine to each other 
and outside parties as part of a conspiracy to plant evidence 
and conduct illegal searches and seizures.  In affirming the 
convictions that followed, the majority explained in detail that 
while Congress had “carved out a specific exemption for 
distribution of controlled substances by law enforcement 
officers, but only the extent that they are ‘lawfully engaged’ 
in the enforcement of drug laws.”  See Cortes-Caban, 691 
                                                                                                     
commission of a felony by the 
party; or 
(5) at night, when there is 
reasonable cause to believe that 
he has committed a felony. 
 
5 V.I.C. § 3562. 
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F.3d at 20 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 885) (emphasis in original).6  
Because the officers in that case acted outside their lawful 
authority to enforce state and federal drug laws, they were 
subject to prosecution under federal drug laws the same as 
anyone else. Id. at 20-22.7 
 Similarly, the Virgin Islands “arrest by a peace officer” 
statute may only be read to grant officers authority to carry 
out arrests under specific circumstances.  It was certainly not 
intended to immunize police officers from prosecution for 
such clearly illegal actions as restraining someone’s liberty 
until a ransom is paid.  Thus, where, as here, the government 
can show that a peace officer’s conduct exceeded  lawful 
authority to arrest and detain, that officer is subject to 
prosecution under any statute that criminalizes his/her 
conduct. 
  
John-Baptiste makes an equally tenuous claim that the 
Virgin Islands kidnapping statute is unconstitutional as 
applied because it is so vague as to not give peace officers 
                                              
6 Indeed, a contrary result would have subjected police 
officers to prosecution for illegal distribution of a controlled 
substance when they gave an informant a controlled 
substance to sell as part of a controlled buy or “sting.” 
 
7 The mere fact that the panel in Cortes-Caban was not 
unanimous does not undermine our belief that John-Baptiste’s 
argument that every action of a Virgin Islands police officer 
is cloaked with legal authority is unreasonable.  The issue that 
divided the panel in Cartes-Caban was whether the evidence 
of a drug “distribution” was sufficient to convict under 21 
USC § 841(a)(1) because Congress had specifically 
authorized some distributions of controlled substances by law 
enforcement officers.  
 
    However, in his dissent, Judge Torruella specifically 
confirmed that he agreed that the evidence of an illegal 
distribution of drugs by a police officer was sufficient to 
convict the defendant of a criminal conspiracy.   (“I agree that 
the record supports the government’s allegations . . . that 
appellants’ actions in planting drugs for the purpose of 
fabricating criminal cases constitutes a violation of 18 USC § 
241.”).  691 F.3d at 30. 
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notice that they could be “arrested and convicted of 
kidnapping for performing [their] official duties.”  John-
Baptiste Br. at 20.  We exercise plenary review over that 
question of law.  San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 
1133 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute” or 
“encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”  
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 
(1972); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983).  “A statute can be void for vagueness not only on its 
face, but as applied, as a result of ‘an unforeseeable and 
retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory 
language.’”  United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 
740, 743 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964)). 
  
We fail to see how a person of ordinary intelligence 
could possibly think that 14 V.I.C. § 1051 (or any other 
legislative enactment) authorizes a police officer to hold 
someone in custody for personal gain until a ransom is paid.  
As the government notes, the Virgin Islands false 
imprisonment and kidnapping statute closely tracks those of 
other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., 18 Pa. Conn. Stat. §§ 2901, 
2903.  Like the Virgin Islands’ statute, these laws generally 
proscribe the removal, transport, or confinement of another 
person when carried out “unlawfully” or “without lawful 
authority.”  For John-Baptiste’s vagueness argument to have 
any merit, we would have to conclude that no reasonable law 
enforcement officer could understand that s/he is proscribed 
from, e.g., confining or imprisoning another person without 
lawful authority.    
  
In fact, the contrary is true.  Police officers can be 
exposed to civil liability under 42 USC § 1983.  In addition, 
in order to lawfully exercise the police power of the state, 
they must understand the constitutional restraints imposed on 
the authority of the state and its agents.   No reasonable 
interpretation of this statute, or any similar statute that we are 
aware of, could conceivably suggest that a police officer may 
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use his/her police power to extort a ransom in exchange for 
releasing someone who was being held in custody.   
 
Here, as in any prosecution for kidnapping, the 
government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted without lawful authority.  That burden is 
easily satisfied where the proof would allow a reasonable 
juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a person 
was held in official custody for private gain rather than in 
furtherance of an officer’s official duties.  Despite John-
Baptiste’s argument to the contrary, we see neither vagueness 
nor room for confusion about the scope of his legal authority 
in the text of 14 V.I.C. § 1051.  
 
 D. Defendants’ Rule 29 Motions.8  
 
 The government appeals the District Court’s grant of 
Brooks’ and Edwards’ Rule 29 motions on counts 5, 6, 10, 
11, and 12 (relating to the extortion of Love) and 46 (relating 
to the Lindquist drug transaction).  John-Baptiste also appeals 
the Court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion (motion for 
judgment of acquittal). He argues there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his conviction for kidnapping (count 27). 
 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
ruling on a Rule 29 motion.  United States v. Applewaithe, 
195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999).  A defendant  
“challenging the sufficiency of the evidence” pursuant to 
Rule 29 “bears a heavy burden.”  United States v. Casper, 
956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992).  In reviewing a verdict for 
sufficiency of the evidence, we “‘consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government and affirm the 
judgment if there is substantial evidence from which any 
rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”  United States v. Benjamin, No. 11-2906, 2013 WL 
1197767, *3 (3d Cir. March 26, 2013) (quoting United States 
v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
                                              
8 “[T]he Rule 29 judgment of acquittal is a substantive 
[judicial] determination that the prosecution has failed to 
carry its burden.” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468 
(2005). 
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1. John-Baptiste’s Conviction for False Imprisonment 
and Kidnapping 
   
 As noted above, under the applicable statute, the 
government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that (1) the defendant, intending the victim to be confined or 
imprisoned, (2) unlawfully took or carried away the victim 
for a substantial distance, (3) against the victim’s will.  14 
V.I.C. § 1051.   
 
 John-Baptiste argues that the government’s evidence 
was insufficient to prove that he acted “without lawful 
authority” when he arrested Calixte.  He claims that the 
government’s evidence largely relied upon the testimony of 
VIPD Officer Rodney Querrard, who testified that the VIPD 
does not recognize an officer’s authority to “unarrest” a 
detainee, as John-Baptiste arguably did once Morino paid the 
ransom to Edwards and Brooks to secure Calixte’s release.  
John-Baptiste reasons that this testimony was irrelevant 
because there was no evidence to show that the policies and 
procedures governing the conduct of a Virgin Islands’ police 
officer such as Querrard also governed officers of the Virgin 
Islands Port Authority Police.  (As noted at the outset, John-
Baptiste was a member of the Virgin Islands Port Authority 
Police).  John-Baptiste also argues that even if Querrard’s 
testimony was properly admitted, it was insufficient to show 
that his (John-Baptiste’s) conduct satisfied the elements of the 
false imprisonment and kidnapping statute.  
 While we certainly agree that failing to follow 
departmental procedures is not tantamount to acting 
unlawfully, the record here contains sufficient evidence that 
John-Baptiste acted without lawful authority in detaining 
Calixte.  Specifically, the government introduced the 
testimony of VIPA Chief Edred Wilkes, who stated that while 
John-Baptiste may have followed VIPA procedures in 
arresting Calixte, he (Wilkes) was “furious” when he learned 
that John-Baptiste released Calixte as a favor to Edwards.  
Joint App. 1083.  Given that testimony, and testimony that 
John-Baptiste accepted money as a condition of releasing 
Calixte, the jury could reasonably conclude that even if the 
original seizure of Calixte was lawful, at some point during 
her detention, John-Baptiste decided to hold her until he 
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received a payment that can only be described as a ransom.  
From that point until the ransom was actually paid, he was 
holding her against her will and when he transported her to 
the location where the ransom was paid, the jury could well 
have concluded that she was being illegally detained and 
transported solely to facilitate receipt of the ransom he 
extorted for her release. 
 
 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of 
evidence, “we are limited to determining whether the 
conclusion chosen by the factfinders was permissible.”  
United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(emphasis added).  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government as verdict winner, we conclude that the evidence 
was more than sufficient to prove that John-Baptiste was 
guilty of false imprisonment and kidnapping as charged in 
count 27.  Indeed, on this record, it is hard to imagine that the 
jury could have concluded anything else 
 
2. Extortion and Conspiracy to Extort Under Federal 
and Territorial Law. 
 
 The government challenges the District Court’s 
judgment of acquittal in favor of Brooks and Edwards after 
the jury convicted them on the charges set forth in counts 5, 
6, 10, 11, and 12. Those counts all related to the officers’ 
extortion of Kenneth Love, who, as noted above, paid Brooks 
and Edwards approximately $825 in return for the release of 
his truck after it was illegally impounded by Brooks and 
Edwards.   
 Counts 5 and 6 charged conspiracy and extortion under 
the Hobbs Act.  To sustain the conspiracy conviction the 
government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Brooks and Edwards knowingly entered into an agreement to 
interfere with interstate commerce by extortion under color of 
official right. 18 U.S.C. § 1951; see also United States v. 
Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 1991).   To prove extortion, 
the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Brooks and Edwards knowingly and willfully obtained 
Love’s property through coercion resulting from the 
“wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, 
or under color of official right” and that this “obstruct[ed], 
delay[ed], or affect[ed] [interstate] commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 
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1951(a), (b)(2); United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 62 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
   a. Extortion  
 
 The District Court granted the Defendants’ post trial 
motion for judgment of acquittal, primarily because Love did 
not make his payment to recover his impounded truck directly 
to Edwards.  Rather, Love testified that he “placed 
[approximately] $825 on the dashboard of [Edwards’s] police 
vehicle” in exchange for obtaining his truck.  Joint App. 36, 
46.  After Love retrieved his truck, he was given an itemized 
receipt for $825. 
 
 The government concedes that there was no direct 
evidence that Edwards took any of the $825 that Love paid, 
but argues that direct evidence was not required.  See United 
States v. Johnson, 203 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).   The 
government contends that the prosecution presented sufficient 
circumstantial evidence at trial to sustain a Hobbs Act 
extortion charge.  The government relies on the following 
evidence: (1)  Edwards repeatedly told Love how much Love 
would have to pay to get his truck back; (2) Edwards told 
Love that she had been “taking money . . . from people” for 
19 years; (3) Edwards ordered Love to put the money on her 
patrol car dashboard; and (4) Love later saw the tow-truck 
driver with only “a couple hundred dollars” in his hand.  Gov. 
Br. at 48-49, Joint App. at 602.  We agree that this was 
sufficient to convict Edwards of Hobbs Act extortion as 
charged in count 6.9 
                                              
9 The extortion charge in count 10 required the government to 
prove the same elements as the Hobbs Act with the exception 
of effect on interstate commerce.  See 14 V.I.C. § 701.  For 
the territorial bribery conviction in count 11, the government 
had to prove that Brooks and Edwards were public officials 
and that they asked for or received “any emolument, gratuity, 
or reward, or promise thereof” in exchange for an official act.  
See id. § 403.  For the conflict of interest charge in count 12, 
the government needed to show that Brooks and Edwards 
were territorial officers who knowingly had an interest in a 
transaction they conducted that was “in substantial conflict 
with the proper discharge of [their] duties.” See 3 V.I.C. § 
1102(3).  Because of these overlapping elements, this same 
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 The jury obviously accepted Love’s testimony that 
after he placed the $825 on Edwards’s dashboard, he saw the 
tow-truck driver with only a couple hundred dollars in his 
hand.  Joint App. 603.  That testimony is circumstantial 
evidence that Edwards gave the tow-truck driver a “couple 
hundred dollars” for his role in the scheme, but that Edwards 
retained most of the $825 that Love placed in Edwards’ patrol 
car.  See, e.g., United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 
(3d Cir. 1989) (“The fact that evidence is circumstantial does 
not make it less probative than direct evidence.”).  This 
evidence, when properly viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, would clearly allow any reasonable juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards was guilty 
of extortion.  
   b. Conspiracy  
 
 The District Court’s apparent reliance on the absence 
of direct evidence also caused it to err in granting a judgment 
of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The court explained 
that it could not find evidence of an explicit agreement 
between Brooks and Edwards.  It did not have to.   The court 
stressed that Brooks remained silent while Edwards told Love 
that she “had been doing this for 19 years, taking money . . . 
from people.”  Joint App. 36.  Thus, while Brooks was 
present in the patrol car while this conversation was going on, 
the Court noted that “mere presence at the scene of the crime 
or association with a criminal is not sufficient evidence of a 
conspiracy.”  Id.   
 
 The government concedes that “mere presence” is 
insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction, but 
underscores that the existence of an agreement can 
nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a 
contract.  See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that proof of an 
element of conspiracy can be shown by circumstantial 
evidence: “A case can be built against the defendant grain-by-
                                                                                                     
result as to counts 5 (discussed below) and 6 also applies to 
the District Court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion 
to acquit on count 10 (extortion under territorial law); count 
11 (bribery under territorial law); and count 12 (conflict of 
interest under territorial law).   
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grain until the scale finally tips.” (quoting United States v. 
Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Indeed, that 
proposition is so firmly established as to require no citation.  
We also agree with the government that the circumstances 
surrounding the interaction of Edwards and Brooks was 
certainly sufficient to establish an illicit agreement between 
the two to extort money from Love.  The tow- truck driver 
involved in returning Love’s car testified that Brooks spoke to 
him about the price he thought Love should pay for the 
release of the truck.  Perhaps most damningly, Brooks sat 
silently by as Edwards explained that she had been taking 
money from people for 19 years.  Therefore, the unique 
circumstances here establish something much more probative 
than “mere presence.” The jury could certainly assume that if 
one police officer boasts of engaging in such illegal activity 
for nearly two decades in the presence of another police 
officer, there must be an agreement and that the agreement 
arises from a “longstanding pattern of activity and mutual 
trust” between the two.  Here, that relationship can be 
discerned from the evidence that sustained convictions for 
other counts as well as the circumstances surrounding the 
release of the truck.  See United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 
188, 199 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that buyer shared 
conspiracy’s goal of distributing cocaine, when circumstantial 
evidence showed he knew about the larger drug operation).10 
                                              
10 In Gibbs, we considered whether circumstantial evidence 
supported the conspiracy conviction of a defendant who 
alleged he merely bought drugs from a member of 
conspiracy, where the evidence included tape-recorded 
conversations between him and his codefendants, many of 
which were in code and had to be interpreted by an FBI agent.  
We held that knowledge of and intent to join a conspiracy can 
be imputed from certain factors such as the length of 
affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy, or 
whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust: “when a 
defendant . . . has repeated, familiar dealings with members 
of a conspiracy, [he] probably comprehends fully the nature 
of the group with whom he is dealing . . . and is more likely 
to perform [acts] for conspiracy members in an effort to 
maintain his connection to them.”  Id. at 199-200.   See also 
United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 308-09 (evidence was 
sufficient to show defendant knew he was participating in 
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 While we agree that the evidence supporting Brooks’ 
and Edwards’ conviction for conspiring to extort Love out of 
his property is more tenuous than the evidence that Edwards 
carried out the extortion plan, membership in a conspiracy 
need not depend on the level of cooperation that the District 
Court required here.  See United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 
300, 305 (“[A] finding of guilt in a conspiracy case does not 
depend on the government introducing direct evidence that a 
defendant was a knowing participant in the conspiracy; 
circumstantial evidence can carry the day.”); United States v. 
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The elements of a 
conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial 
evidence . . . .”).  Thus, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the  government, we conclude that the District 
Court erred in granting judgment of acquittal on the 
conspiracy counts and that portion of the court’s order will be 
reversed.11  
 
c.   Conspiracy to Distribute Drugs Under 21 U.S.C. § 
846 
 
 
 Count 46 charged Brooks and Edwards with 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled 
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The charge 
relates to Brooks’s and Edwards’s interactions with John 
Lindquist.  As noted above, the government introduced 
evidence that Brooks coerced Lindquist into selling crack 
cocaine for him.  That evidence established that Lindquist 
received the crack cocaine from Edwards while he sat in the 
back of the officers’ patrol car.  Although Edwards handed 
the bag containing the crack cocaine to Lindquist and told 
him that Brooks expected to receive $3,500 for its contents, 
                                                                                                     
criminal enterprise, as required to sustain conviction for 
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, where 
defendant picked up coconspirator at airport and transported 
coconspirator’s luggage to another car, where evidence 
showed defendant knew the luggage contained money from 
illegal activities, and where conspiracy was operated for a 
number of years and involved multiple drug–related 
transactions). 
 
11  In reversing the Distr ict Court’s grant of the Rule 29 motion here, we caution that our analy sis is limited to the precise circumstances of this case.  As we have explained, the jury  heard that one police office boasted of 19 years of  “shaking down” cit izens  in front of another police officer.  That evidence, has additional force here because Edwards and Brooks were both law enforcement officers.  
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Lindquist neither heard Edwards admit that she knew what 
was in the bag, nor saw her look into it.   
 
 To establish a conspiracy, the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) 
an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and (3) an 
agreement to work toward that goal.  United States v. Boria, 
592 F.3d 476, 488 n. 12 (3d Cir. 2010).  It may do so by 
direct or circumstantial evidence.  United States v. Brodie, 
403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have also required 
proof that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy’s 
illegal goal.  Id. at 148.  
 
 We must therefore examine the record to determine 
whether the government set forth “drug-related evidence, 
considered with the surrounding circumstances, from which a 
rational trier of fact could logically infer that the defendant 
knew a controlled substance was involved in the transaction.”  
Boria, 592 F.3d at 481. 
 
 In granting the defendants’ Rule 29 motion on this 
count, the court reasoned that there was insufficient evidence 
for the jury to conclude that Edwards knew the contents of the 
bag.  See, e.g., Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 287.  The District 
Court concluded that the evidence of a conspiracy was 
therefore insufficient against Edwards, and thus necessarily 
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brooks 
conspired with her.  Joint App. 29. 
 
 However, after defendants’ trial, we decided United 
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, where we reexamined our test 
for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in drug 
conspiracy cases such as this.  726 F.3d at 431.  In doing so, 
we recognized that we had previously overturned convictions 
in the absence of specific evidence of a defendant’s 
knowledge of the identity of the illegal drugs s/he possessed 
even though circumstantial evidence may have been sufficient 
to establish that knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430-431.  We 
acknowledged that our jurisprudence in this area had “failed 
to apply the deferential standard the law requires on review of 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges.” Id. at 419.   As we 
explained, we had previously sometimes examined the 
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evidence under a microscope – rather than reviewing the 
evidence as a whole and giving deference to the jury’s 
verdict.  Id. at 430.  Our decision in that case clarified that the 
appropriate standard of review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a drug conspiracy case is the same as in all other 
cases: the jury’s verdict must be assessed from the 
perspective of a reasonable juror, and must be upheld if the 
evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew 
what was in his/her possession.  Id. at 431 (abrogating United 
States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1988), United 
States v. Salmon, 944 F.3d 1106, United States v. Thomas, 
114 F.3d 403, United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d 
Cir. 1998), and United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281 (3d 
Cir. 2004)).  Moreover, we specifically disavowed our prior  
analytical approach and reasoning – that the jury’s verdict 
could not stand when the evidence was as consistent with 
other contraband, as it was with controlled substances.  Id. at 
432 
 
 Thus, while this issue may have presented a close 
question when the District Court originally decided it, it is 
now clear that the District Court’s grant of this Rule 29 
motion was not sufficiently deferential to the jury’s verdict.  
 
 The evidence introduced at trial established that in 
2009, Lindquist met with Brooks and Edwards, who arrived 
together in a car.  Lindquist got into the car, and Edwards 
handed him a bag while informing him that Brooks wanted 
$3,500 for it.  Lindquist looked into the bag, recognized its 
contents, and got out of the car.  Over the course of the next 
several months, Lindquist sold the crack cocaine that was in 
the bag and gave the proceeds to Brooks.  The government 
also argues: “based on the timing of their meeting, the bag’s 
small size, flimsy construction, and light weight, and 
Edward’s statement that ‘Brooks wants $3,500 for this,’ along 
with evidence of a 2005 incident involving the sale to Kelvin 
Moses of six pounds of marijuana, the jury could have 
concluded that Edwards knew the bag contained drugs.”  
Gov. Br. at 51. We agree. 
 
 The same reasoning would have allowed the jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards knew that 
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the illegal venture involved drugs.  See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d at 433.  In Caraballo-Rodriguez, the defendant 
responded to questions about whether he knew that a suitcase 
contained drugs by saying: “I didn’t know it was drugs. I 
knew that it was something bad . . . Because nobody is going 
to pay five thousand dollars for picking up suitcases.” Id. at 
422.  We reasoned that the jury could have concluded from 
the surrounding circumstances that the defendant knew the 
suitcases contained drugs.  Similarly, here, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that these two police officers had enough 
common sense and knowledge to understand that if Brooks 
expected $3500 for the sale of whatever was in the paper bag, 
Brooks wanted Lindquist to sell the contents of the bag, and 
given the expected price, the bag most surely didn’t contain a 
tuna fish sandwich. 
 
 Moreover, while mere presence at the scene of the 
crime or association with a criminal is not sufficient evidence 
of a conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 
192 (3d Cir. 2011), the evidence here is – once again – 
substantially more than “mere presence.”  The events 
involving Lindquist took place in 2009, several years into a 
longstanding pattern of illicit activity between Edwards and 
Brooks. That activity had, in the past, involved recruiting 
third parties to sell drugs for them.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[A]lthough the 
number of transactions here does not, on its own, prove 
[defendant’s] knowledge of the character of the conspiracy, it 
does make it more likely that he knew the business he was 
about.”).  Given the circumstances here, the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the jury’s conclusion that Edwards 
understood that she was participating in a drug transaction.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s verdict on count 46 
did not “fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”  
Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012).  We 
therefore reverse the District Court’s grant of the Rule 29 
motion on that count, and the guilty verdict will be reinstated 
as to both Edwards and Brooks.12 
                                              
12 Since the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on 
this count, we reject Edwards’s argument that the District 
Court improperly attributed the entire 4.5 ounces of cocaine 
to her at sentencing.   
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E. Brooks’s Rule 33 Motion for New Trial on RICO 
Conspiracy13 
  
Brooks claims that the District Court erred in denying his 
Rule 33 motion for a new trial on his conviction for RICO 
conspiracy.  He argues that the jury considered evidence of 
acquitted conduct in convicting him on that count.  We 
review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal under 
Rule 33 for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Silveus, 542 
F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008).   However, we again view the 
evidence supporting a conviction “in the light most favorable 
to the government and affirm[s] the judgment if there is 
substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact 
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Benjamin, 2013 
WL 1197767, at *3. 
 
To establish a conviction for a RICO conspiracy, the 
government must show: (1) that two or more persons agreed 
to conduct or to participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the defendant was a 
party to or member of that agreement; and (3) that the 
defendant joined the agreement or conspiracy knowing of its 
objective to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity.  United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 
214, 224 (3d Cir. 1983).14 
 
To establish a pattern of racketeering activity, the 
government must show that there was “‘continuity plus 
relationship’ among the predicate acts.” United States v. 
                                                                                                     
 
13 Under F. R. Crim. P. 33, a court may grant a new trial on 
motion of the defendant “if the interest of justice so requires.” 
 
14 We note that on appeal Brooks does not expressly argue 
that the government failed to set forth evidence establishing 
his association with an “enterprise.”  Accordingly, we need 
not discuss that element of the crime.  However, for a 
thorough discussion of the proof needed to establish a RICO 
enterprise, see United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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Mark, No. 10-4075, 2012 WL 120092, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 
2012) (quoting Sedima S.P.R.I. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
496 n.14 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 158 
(1969))).  Racketeering acts are “related” if the acts had the 
same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims or methods of commission.  
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 
36, 39 (3d Cir.1987). “[S]poradic and separate criminal 
activities alone cannot give rise to a pattern for RICO 
purposes . . . .” Mark, 2012 WL 120092, at *3 (quoting 
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1991).  
 
Count 1 of the indictment charged a RICO conspiracy 
and included the following predicate acts: drug trafficking, 
alien harboring, kidnapping, bribery, and extortion.  In 
support of these charges, the government relied on the 
testimony of Moses, Lindquist, Deeb, Willock, and Love 
(discussed in Section I.A).  The testimony of these witnesses 
established that Brooks and Edwards regularly demanded 
money in exchange for drugs or property. 
 
  Before submitting the case to the jury, the District 
Court acquitted the defendants on all counts relating to Deeb 
and Willock, as well as several others.  Joint App. 1311, 
2125.  Accordingly, the District Court instructed the jury that 
it had to agree on at least two of the remaining racketeering 
acts (drug trafficking conspiracy, drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, kidnapping for extortion, extortion, and bribery).  
The jury convicted Brooks (and Edwards) of the RICO 
conspiracy and twelve counts charging offenses that were 
predicate acts, but the District Court granted Brooks’s Rule 
29 motion as to four of those twelve counts (6, 10, 11, and 
46).  The jury did not specify, nor was it asked to specify, 
which of the predicate acts it relied upon to convict on the 
RICO conspiracy charge. 
 
Brooks argues that the dismissal of four of the twelve 
counts relating to the predicate acts required a new trial, since 
the jury could have relied on dismissed counts to convict him 
of the RICO charge.  He also claims that the lack of 
credibility of the particular witnesses casts doubt on the 
convictions on the remaining eight counts. 
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It is well established that if a jury convicts the 
defendant on two or more of the predicate acts constituting a 
RICO violation, the conviction on the RICO count itself will 
withstand a challenge even if the jury acquitted the defendant 
on several counts charging other predicate acts.  See United 
States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (7th Cir. 1988).  
Even where the jury’s verdict is inconsistent, the RICO 
conviction must stand so long as there is sufficient evidence 
to prove that the defendant committed two or more predicate 
acts.  United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1331 (1993).  
As noted, even accounting for the four counts on which the 
District Court granted the Rule 29 motions, Brooks’s (and 
Edwards’s) eight convictions for offenses that were predicate 
RICO acts remain (including extortion, bribery, and drug 
trafficking).  The convictions foreclose Brooks’ challenge to 
the court’s denial of his Rule 33 motion on the RICO offense 
charged in count 1.  Holzer, 840 F.2d at 1350–51 (“[A] jury is 
presumed to act rationally, and a rational jury would convict a 
defendant of racketeering . . . [e]ven if it had exonerated 
[him] of all the predicate offenses charged except one act of 
extortion and one receipt of a bribe.”).  Moreover, Brooks’s 
attack on the sufficiency of evidence amounts to little more 
than a challenge to the credibility of the witnesses.15 See 
United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to reconcile “inconsistencies” in testimony because 
“witness credibility [is] an area peculiarly within the jury’s 
domain”).   Thus, the District Court properly rejected his 
claim.  
 
F. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
 Both Brooks and Edwards argue that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred during the trial when the prosecutor 
withheld exculpatory evidence and suborned perjury.  Their 
argument pertains to the government’s use of three witnesses: 
Love, Deeb, and Willock.  As we explain, this argument is 
unpersuasive. 
 
 1. Kenneth Love—Identification of Brooks 
 
                                              
15 See Brooks Br. at 15-22. 
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At trial, Love identified Edwards but could not identify 
Brooks.  Joint App. 570–71.  Thereafter, during a break in 
Love’s testimony, Love and an agent had lunch at the same 
pizzeria where Brooks and his family ate, and the agent 
pointed Love out.  Joint App. 589.  Brooks argues that this 
was improper because Love had not finished his testimony.  
Brooks Br. 23–24. 
 
The agent’s conduct was clearly improper, and the 
incident could have been problematic.  However, the District 
Court competently handled the situation.  Upon the parties’ 
return to the courtroom, the Court held a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury to discuss what had occurred during the 
break.  Since Love had not been able to identify Brooks in the 
courtroom prior to the incident, the Court dismissed any 
suggestion of a tainted identification and allowed the 
government to continue Love’s direct examination.  Joint 
App. 595-96.   Thereafter, Love was not asked to identify 
Brooks, nor did he identify Brooks at any point during trial.  
See Joint App. 594–95. 
 
Brooks also argues that Love falsely testified that he 
had read Brooks’ name on Brooks’ name tag or badge, Joint 
App. 581.  That testimony was undermined by other officers 
who testified that VIPD officers’ badges have numbers, but 
no names and that names are not displayed on uniforms.  See 
Joint App. 1657–58.  However, that conflicting testimony 
only raised a credibility issue that the jury was free to resolve.  
Moreover, Brooks fails to explain why the officers’ testimony 
should be given more weight than Love’s, and we agree with 
the District Court’s decision to refrain from usurping the role 
of the jury by attempting to resolve this conflict in Brooks’ 
favor.  See United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is the jury’s province . . . to make 
credibility determinations and to assign weight to the 
evidence.”); United States v. Prejean, 517 F. App’x 107, 109 
(3d Cir. 2013) (jury free to discredit witness’s testimony and 
instead believe evidence offered by other party).   
 
Moreover, even if we assume that Love was not 
truthful about seeing Brooks’s name on his badge, the jury 
was free to accept the balance of Love’s testimony.  See 
United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2003) 
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(noting that “a jury can believe some witness’s testimony as 
to some aspects, and disbelieve others, or not believe any, or 
believe all.”); Barber v. CSX Distribution Svcs., 68 F.3d 694, 
700 (3d Cir. 1009) (evaluation of witness credibility is 
exclusive function of jury, and jury can always choose to 
discredit testimony); McCann v. Miller, 502 F. App’x 163, 
170 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012) (jury not required to believe all of the 
testimony offered by an interested witness).  
 
2. Elias Deeb—Alleged Suppression of Exculpatory 
Evidence 
 
Brooks also argues that the government engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct by omitting an exculpatory portion 
of Deeb’s recorded conversation with a federal agent.  Joint 
App. 447-50.  In order for Brooks to succeed, “[t]he evidence 
at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must 
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”  Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  Here, nothing in the 
record suggests that the prosecution’s decision to only play a 
portion of the conversation between Deeb and a federal agent 
amounted to misconduct.  The government introduced the full 
tape into evidence.  On cross-examination, Brooks’s counsel 
played the allegedly exculpatory conversation for the jury, 
and highlighted the fact that Deeb never discussed Brooks’ 
involvement in the scheme to obtain a driver’s license.  
Accordingly, even if it could be argued that the prosecution 
“suppressed” evidence by failing to directly present it to the 
jury, it cannot be said that the failure prejudiced Brooks.  
 
3.  Troy Willock—Controversy Surrounding Witness 
Identity 
 
Lastly, Brooks and Edwards contend that the 
prosecution purposefully concealed the controversy 
concerning the identity of Troy Willock (“Willock 1”), who 
testified in relation to the marijuana theft charged in counts 
48 to 52.  Willock 1 was a cooperating witness who testified 
that in 2008, he saw Brooks “pocket a quantity of marijuana” 
taken from a dealer during a “shakedown.”  United States v. 
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Edwards, No. 2010-36, 2011 WL 5834241, *3 (D.V.I. Nov. 
18, 2011).   
 
Prior to trial, the government learned that the VIPD 
had files on two Troy Willocks with different fingerprints and 
photographs but the same name and birthday.  The 
government claims that on the first day of trial, one of the 
prosecutors placed copies of Willock 1’s National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) report, along with his Pre-
Sentence Report (PSR) for his pending drug charges, on 
defense counsels’ table.  Joint App.  2666-68.  The 
government claims that both reports listed multiple social 
security numbers for Willock 1 and disclosed what the 
government knew about its witness at that time.  Joint App. 
2666-68.  Defense counsel acknowledged having received the 
packets, but no defendant cross-examined Willock 1 about his 
identity.  Joint App. 2470-22, 2474, 2477; see Joint App. 678-
94.   
 
In or about April 2011, another person using the name 
Troy Willock (“Willock 2”) complained to the Social 
Security Administration in St. Thomas that Willock 1 had 
stolen his identity.  Joint App. 2666-68.  Later that month, 
Willock 1 appeared for sentencing pursuant to a guilty plea in 
an unrelated drug distribution case. Willock 1’s attorney 
asked to withdraw on grounds that he “had reason to believe 
that Willock 1 is not who he claims to be.”  Id.  Counsel also 
stated that he believed that Willock 1 had stolen Willock 2’s 
identity. 
 
On November 1, 2011, the District Court held a 
hearing to consider the defendants’ motion for a new trial and 
determine whether the controversy surrounding Willock 1’s 
identity had in any way affected this trial.  Following the 
hearing, the Court denied the defendants’ motion.  The Court 
held that: (1) there was no specific evidence that Willock 1 
had perjured himself at trial, as he testified that his name was 
“Troy Willock” and no conflicting evidence was introduced; 
(2) there was not sufficient evidence to show that, if Willock 
1 committed perjury, the government knew of it before or 
during trial; and (3) if Willock1 committed perjury and the 
government was blameless, the perjury did not result in a 
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manifest injustice that would require upsetting the jury’s 
verdict.  Joint App.  2669.   
 
On appeal, Brooks and Edwards claim that Willock 1’s 
alleged perjury amounts to a due process violation because 
the government either knew or should have known that 
Willock 1 would offer false testimony.  They claim that the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying their motion 
for a new trial because there was a “reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony . . . affected the judgment of the jury.”  
United States v. Augurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  We reject 
their arguments for substantially the same reasons relied on 
by the District Court.  
 
For such a claim to succeed, the defendants must 
show:  “(1) [the government’s witness] committed perjury; 
(2) the government knew or should have known of his 
perjury; (3) the testimony went uncorrected; and (4) there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the verdict.”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 
242 (3d Cir. 2004).   This record does not contain any 
evidence that would render the District Court’s findings 
regarding the alleged perjury clearly erroneous.  
Discrepancies regarding his social security number 
notwithstanding, there is no direct evidence that Willock 1’s 
name was anything other than “Troy Willock” when the 
District Court held an evidentiary hearing into the matter.  A 
finding that the witness did not commit perjury would itself 
“preclude a finding of constitutional error.”  Lambert, 387 
F.3d at 243. 
 
The issue of knowledge is a thornier one.  At the time 
of trial, the government certainly appears to have been aware 
that VIPD records for “Troy Willock” listed two individuals 
sharing the same name and birth date -- a fact that the District 
Court admitted should have raised red flags.  See Edwards, 
2011 WL 5834241, at *7 (noting odds that two individuals 
share same name and birth date is “far from impossible” but 
nonetheless a “highly improbable coincidence”).  Moreover, 
even if the government did not know that one number 
belonged to another person, it also understood from NCIC 
reports that one of the two Willocks was claiming two 
separate Social Security numbers.  Id. at *8.  Ultimately, as 
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the District Court noted, it is clear that, at a minimum, the 
government should have investigated the identity of its 
witness further prior to Willock 1’s appearance at the 
defendants’ trial.     
 
However, even assuming arguendo that Willock 1 
committed perjury and/or that the government knew or should 
have known that,  Willock 1’s testimony could not have 
prejudiced the defendants’ entire case.  His testimony was 
only relevant to counts 48 to 52 and those charges were 
dismissed at the close of the government’s case.  Joint App. 
1311.  The transaction Willock 1 testified about did not 
pertain to the RICO conspiracy charged in count 1 for which 
Brooks and Edwards were convicted. 
  
G.   Limitations on Cross-Examination and the 
Introduction of Character Testimony 
 
Edwards, Brooks, and John-Baptiste all challenge 
several of the District Court’s rulings regarding the admission 
of evidence.  We review these claims for abuse of discretion.  
See United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213-14 (3d Cir. 
2009).  The District Court’s exercise of discretion is 
commonly left undisturbed “unless no reasonable person 
would adopt [its] view.”  Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting 
Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 1. District Court’s Limiting of Cross-
Examination of Government  Witnesses 
  
Three of the government’s witnesses against Edwards 
were facing their own criminal charges when they testified.  
On cross-examination, Edwards sought to elicit information 
from the witnesses relating to any deals each made with the 
government in exchange for their cooperation.  The District 
Court (acting sua sponte) permitted only questions going to 
the general contours of the sentence reductions and prohibited 
questions relating to the specific lengths of time they faced 
without cooperation.  The Court’s stated concern was that talk 
of specific terms of incarceration would prejudice the jury by 
“putting visions of jail and incarceration and penalties” into 
the jurors’ minds as they deliberated, and cause confusion of 
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the issues because they would lack details as to the actual 
lengths of the witnesses’ sentences.   
 
Edwards claims that the District Court infringed on her 
constitutional right to confrontation by limiting the scope of 
the cross-examination of three government witnesses to 
nonspecific questions regarding the reduction of their 
sentences they received in exchange for their cooperation. 
 
The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to 
cross-examine the government’s witnesses for possible bias.  
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316–17 (1974). However, “[a] 
district court retains ‘wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns 
about . . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only 
marginally relevant.’”  United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 
161, 169 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).  We review any restriction of 
cross-examination for abuse of discretion and will reverse 
only when the restriction “is so severe as to constitute a denial 
of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him and 
. . . is prejudicial to [his] substantial rights.” United States v. 
Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In assessing whether a limitation on cross-
examination violated the Confrontation Clause, we inquire 
into: “(1) whether the limitation significantly limited the 
defendant’s right to inquire into a witness’s motivation for 
testifying; and (2) whether the constraints imposed fell within 
the reasonable limits that a district court has the authority to 
impose.”  Mussare, 405 F.3d at 169.  The District Court’s 
ruling was well within this parameter.  
 
The District Court limited inquiry only into specific 
sentences that could have been imposed if the witnesses had 
refused to cooperate—a line of questioning that we have 
allowed trial courts to curtail.  See Mussare, 405 F.3d at 170 
(rejecting “categorical right to inquire into the penalty a 
cooperating witness would otherwise have received”).  
Indeed, the District Court allowed testimony regarding the 
witnesses’ agreements to cooperate with the government and 
the fact that they expected to receive more lenient sentences 
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in return.  See, e.g., JA 654-55 (exchange between defense 
counsel and Moses in which Moses admits, inter alia, that he 
“entered into an agreement with the government for what’s 
referred to as substantial assistance”).  We conclude that there 
was no abuse of discretion here. 
 
 2. District Court’s Limiting of Cross-
Examination of Deeb 
 
 Edwards attempted to attack Deeb’s credibility by 
cross-examining him about Deeb’s alleged submission of a 
fraudulent insurance claim.  Edwards wanted to produce two 
witnesses who would have testified about this.  The District 
Court ruled that such extrinsic evidence was both 
impermissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b),16 and barred by 
Fed. R. Evid. 403 because it would result in an unnecessarily 
confusing “mini insurance trial.”  Because Deeb’s 
compensation from the FBI and DEA was at issue, the 
District Court limited any inquiry related to an insurance 
payout to matters relating to his income, and not to the 
alleged fraud itself.  Edwards’s again argues that the District 
Court’s decision to limit defense counsel’s cross-examination 
was a violation of her confrontation rights.  See Edwards’s 
Br. at 19-23. 
 
Edwards’s confrontation argument as to Deeb must 
also fail.  In denying Edwards’s defense counsel the 
opportunity to question Deeb as to his past insurance claim, 
the District Court stressed that it had never been established 
that Deeb acted fraudulently.  See Joint App. A 500-02.  
Accordingly, the District Court acted well within its 
discretion in concluding that any questions this insurance 
                                              
16 Rule 608(a) provides that a party may attack a 
witness’s credibility “by testimony about the witness’s 
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an 
opinion about that character.”  The rule prohibits 
“extrinsic evidence … to prove a specific instance[] of 
a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the 
witness’s character for truthfulness….”  See United 
States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir. 1997).   
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claim were potentially confusing, misleading, and risked 
unnecessary delay. 
 
 3. District Court’s Exclusion of Out-of-
Court Statements 
 
During trial, John-Baptiste intended to have five 
witnesses, who were present during the incident with Calixte 
testify about that incident.  This is the incident we have 
discussed above17 and is the same incident that formed the 
basis of the charges against John-Baptiste.  John-Baptiste 
insisted that his arrest of Calixte was the result of an 
altercation in which Calixte refused to move her unlawfully 
parked cab and then proceeded to physically attack him.  The 
proffered testimony was offered to establish that the force 
used, the arrest, and the detention, were all reasonable under 
the circumstances.  Moreover, John-Baptiste intended to use 
witnesses’ recollection that, before the altercation with 
Calixte, he told the drivers of parked cars “125, 125”— which 
the witnesses understood was the fine for parking in the 
relevant loading zone ($125).  The testimony was intended to 
show that he fairly and properly enforced VIPA rules. 
 
The District Court sustained hearsay objections and 
limited the witnesses’ testimony only to what they saw, rather 
than what they heard.  The court also rejected John-Baptiste’s 
argument that the statements were verbal parts of acts 
showing the state of mind of both parties and therefore not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  Because this 
incident, and Calixte’s post-arrest complaints, form the basis 
of the allegations against John-Baptiste, he argues that the 
District Court’s “mechanistic[]” application of the hearsay 
rule denied him due process, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284 (1973).  Jean-Baptiste Br. at 33-34. 
John-Baptiste’s argument relies on two exceptions to 
the hearsay rules.  First, he claims that any statements he 
sought to introduce were not hearsay because they constituted 
“verbal acts”—a legally operative statement, like making a 
contract or a threat.  United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Second—as the government concedes—John-
                                              
17 See Section I.A. 
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Baptiste’s argument could also be characterized as invoking 
the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.  
 
Under either of these theories, John-Baptiste’s 
arguments would fail.  First, it is unclear how any of the 
testimony that John-Baptiste sought to introduce—which, he 
explains would have gone to show the “reasonableness of the 
actions of the officer”—could be characterized as “verbal 
acts.” See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (“The hearsay rule excludes … statements which 
themselves ‘affect[] the legal rights of the parties or [are] 
circumstance[s] bearing on conduct affecting their rights.’” 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(c))).  Moreover, to the extent any 
testimony would have gone to show either John-Baptiste’s or 
Calixte’s frame of mind during their exchange, the 
government correctly notes that other non-hearsay testimony 
regarding observations adequately informed the jurors of the 
confrontation.—“[John-Baptiste] approached her car; she 
threw a drink can at him; he reached for the door handle; he 
pulled her out; she kicked him; they scuffled; he put 
handcuffs on her….”  Gov. Br. at 33.  Accordingly, the 
District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion when 
it foreclosed the use of this testimony.18 
 
 4. District Court’s Refusal to Allow 
John-Baptiste to Cross- Examine VIPA 
Chief Wilkes on Calixte’s Prior Statements 
 
 On cross-examination of VIPA Chief Edred Wilkes, 
John-Baptiste’s defense counsel asked a series of questions 
attempting to show that Calixte had made statements 
inconsistent with her prior testimony.  The District Court 
refused to allow this line of questioning because it constituted 
                                              
18 Moreover, John-Baptiste’s argument misses the force of the 
Calixte incident. That incident resulted in criminal charges 
not because of the initial seizure and detention which may 
have been appropriate as well as legal.  However, despite the 
legality of the initial arrest, as explained above, it is clear on 
this record that at some point after she was arrested, John-
Baptiste continued Calixte’s detention in order to extort a 
ransom for her release.  That is the criminality, not the initial 
arrest and detention. 
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improper impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 613.  Rule 613 
required that Calixte first be given the opportunity to “explain 
or deny” any extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement.  Joint App. 1120-23.  John-Baptiste claims that the 
District Court’s ruling was erroneous and contributed to the 
denial of his due process rights.  The argument is meritless as 
the Court’s ruling was clearly consistent with Rule 613 and 
well within the Court’s discretion.  See United States v. 
Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Rule 613 requires 
that a witness be given the opportunity to admit or deny a 
prior inconsistent statement before extrinsic evidence of that 
statement may be introduced.”). 
 
5. Government’s use of 
Deborah Harrigan’s 
 Testimony to Rebut 
Edwards’s Alibi  Evidence 
 
 Edwards claims that the District Court erred by 
permitting the government to introduce testimony from 
Deborah Harrigan, because defense counsel had not 
received adequate notice of her testimony as required 
by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1.  Edwards Br. at 6-7.   
 Harrigan is a VIPD payroll custodian who 
rebutted Edwards’s claim that she was away for nearly 
all of 2005.  Harrigan testified that Edwards worked 
VIPD shifts from August 22 through August 31, 2005.  
Edwards did provide notice of an alibi in accordance 
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(a) as to September 4-18, 2005 
(when the drug transaction alleged in counts 3 and 4 
took place).  However, at trial,  Edwards testified that 
she was away for nearly all of 2005 and that “from 
August to September” she was in Antigua.  Joint App. 
1760.   
 The court properly allowed the government to 
expand the scope of Harrigan’s testimony to address 
Edwards’ expanded alibi.  Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12.1(3) grants courts the discretion to admit 
or prohibit a witness’s testimony if a party fails to 
provide the notice required by 12.1(a).  The court may 
grant an exception to the notice requirements “[f]or 
good cause.” Id. 12.1(d).  Accordingly, the rule 
provides the district court with discretion and acts to 
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prevent surprise at trial.  Harrigan’s testimony was 
properly admitted in response to Edwards’ own failure 
to give adequate notice for her alibi.  United States v. 
Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 312 (3d Cir. 1985).  Moreover, 
Edwards was paid for the period in question, and 
presumably knew that time sheets reflecting that she 
was on duty during that period would be available to 
offer into evidence.  Thus, she cannot seriously claim 
that she was surprised by Harrigan’s testimony.  
Accordingly, we conclude the District Court acted 
within its discretion in allowing Harrigan’s testimony 
regarding Edwards’s whereabouts in August 2005 
without prior notice from defense counsel. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction as to each defendant.  We will 
reverse the District Court’s ruling acquitting Brooks and 
Edwards of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance 
(count 46).  We also reverse the District Court’s ruling 
acquitting Brooks and Edwards of extortion and conspiracy to 
extort (counts 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12).  Accordingly, we will 
vacate and remand with directions that the District Court 
reinstate the jury’s verdict of conviction and proceed to 
resentencing. 
 
 
 
